How to strengthen cooperation between Special Procedures and the un membership has been a constant source of debate and negotiation since the establishment of the first mandate in 1967. Over the intervening years, many ideas have been generated.
i Introduction
Mandate holders' ability to secure cooperation and the related willingness of a State to work with Special Procedures are among the most important structural determinants of the mechanism's influence and impact. ii
From Promotion to Protection
As has been widely noted, 'the Charter nowhere explicitly provides authorisation for the political organs of the United Nations to assume monitoring competences in the field of human rights' .2 Rather, the Charter sets out that the un would seek to 'achieve international cooperation… in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights' .3 It took almost 20 years after the Charter's adoption for the un to move towards a more robust and protection-focussed approach to human rights, and the development of Special Procedures was a fundamental component of that change. The system's creation4 directly contravened the idea of non-interference in domestic affairs, as set out in article 2.7 of the un Charter. Buergenthal insists that by taking this step the un began 'to pierce the veil of national sovereignty' in order to respond to serious cases of human rights violations.5 Over the following decades, Special Procedures continued to assist with the movement from promotion to protection of human rights. That movement relied on individual mandate holders taking steps unprecedented in terms of interfering in States' affairs. Abdoulaye Dieye, Special Rapporteur on human rights in Chile, paved the way for mandate holders directly to consider
